International Life

Country – splinter. To the 80th anniversary of the break in relations between the USSR and Uruguay

At this time, 80 years ago, in Moscow, foreign employees expelled from Montevideo were unpacking their bags and doing forced employment, and, on the contrary, those Soviet diplomats who were preparing to fight, as it was said in the Soviet press, insignificant Uruguay in the League of Nations were going on a business trip . At the turn of 1935-1936, Uruguay not only demanded the closure of the opened diplomatic mission of the USSR (the first in South America), but also broke off relations with the Soviet Union altogether. Why did the South American republic, which was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR (and before that – with the Russian Empire) do this? Many questions have only been answered today.

. In the Southern Hemisphere, the opposite is true. Like standing on your feet, but upside down. We have summer, they have winter. But despite the dense winter drizzle, from almost all the eastern suburbs of Montevideo, over the stormy waters of the Rio de la Plata, Isla de Flores, the Island of Flowers, is still visible. However, in the mid-1930s, the inhabitants of this island were definitely not up to romance. Here was a prison for political.

Nuances

One of the most famous prisoners of this island prison was Emilio Frugoni. In 1943, he would become the first ambassador of Uruguay to the USSR after the restoration of relations. But in the 1930s he ended up behind bars as one of the leaders of the left: the founding father of the Socialist Party of Uruguay (SPU), which, along with the communists, rebelled against the regime of the right-wing President Gabriel Terra.

The defeat of the left was so thorough that in September 1937, the secretariat of Dolores Ibarruri (at that time the acting curator of Latin America in the Executive Committee of the Comintern – ECCI) stated: There is no connection with some countries at all 1 . This applied to Uruguay, perhaps even in the first place.

In general, it turns out that the story of the rupture of relations between Uruguay and the USSR is clear: relations fell as a “collateral victim” of the crisis in domestic politics.

So it is. If not for a few nuances.

Firstly, before that, the Socialist Party, headed by Frugoni, had seriously suffered not from the right, but from its own left: from those very “brothers” – the communists. In 1921 (quite unexpectedly for Frugoni), the party he had fostered was “covered” by a split: having accepted the “21 conditions of the Comintern”, most of the SPU members separated into the Communist Party of Uruguay (CPU). True, when he came to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, the Uruguayan Francisco Pintos told his fellow party members that in Moscow they did not know about the existence of not only the Communist Party, but also of Uruguay itself 2 . But in the Comintern, decisions were made quickly at that time: almost immediately, Pintos was co-opted into the ECCI, which soon spread the practice of creating “land secretaries” to the south of the New World 3 . By the way, fate decreed that later the South American Secretariat of the Comintern (SACI) was destined to be just in Montevideo.

Secondly, as in the rest of the world, at a certain moment the Uruguayan communists took up arms not against the bourgeoisie, but against the socialists. At the beginning of the next decade, SACI added to its ideological arsenal the consideration that the SPU is also social-fascist, which means that no rapprochement with it is possible 4 . It got to the point that the day after Frugoni was elected dean of the Faculty of Law of the Republican University, the press organ of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Khustisia newspaper, called him a completely derogatory term rabbit 5 .

That is, if the right-wing authorities of Uruguay fought against the left, then these left-wing ones themselves were, to put it mildly, divided: if they had a dialogue, it was in absentia and very insulting.

Thirdly, for all the intrigue of Uruguayan domestic politics, in the case of this country, something else is even more important.

And for the Russian Empire, and for the USSR, and for the new Russia, Uruguay itself has always been the gateway to the continent. From the most recent: it was in Montevideo in March 2016 that the first visiting format in Latin America of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum was held. The Bering-Bellingshausen Institute, founded in Uruguay, was the co-organizer: the first new non-governmental organization in several decades whose statutory task is to develop Russian-Latin American relations. Next year, 2017, we will already celebrate the 160th anniversary of a truly key moment in Russia’s relations with all of Latin America: now, in the very distant 1857, the Russian reformer tsar Alexander II did not fail to respond to a letter of notice from the President of Uruguay, Gabriel Pereira (by the way, a descendant of founding father of the country H.H. Artigas) on the desirability of mutual recognition. Prior to this, Russia in the south of the New World had relations only with a kindred monarchy – Brazilian Empire. Thanks to the initiative of the Uruguayans, the establishment of relations between the Russian crown and republics Latin America.

It is noteworthy that in 1944, at a meeting in Moscow of the Soviet envoy N.V. Gorelkin, who was just getting ready in Montevideo, and E. Frugoni, who was already working in the USSR, both of them remembered the first Russian envoy in Uruguay, Alexander Ionin 6 . Having visited Montevideo for the first time back in May 1886, in his book “Across South America” he likened Montevideo to Constantinople, comparing the complexity and importance of the Rio de la Plata question with the “eastern question” of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles 7 .

Located between such giants as Argentina and Brazil, and having finally acquired sovereignty as a result of the compromise Anglo-Argentine-Brazilian agreements of 1828-1830 8, small Uruguay is really doomed to constant geopolitical tightrope walking 9 . In the turbulent 20th century, the Uruguayans themselves used terms such as “Gibraltar of the Western Hemisphere” 10 and “cork city” (from the “bottle” of Rio de la Plata 11 ) referring to their capital.In the reports of the Soviet diplomatic mission, newly discovered in Montevideo during the Great Patriotic War, the Uruguay was spoken of as a “splinter” 12. And the newspaper El Debate was also quoted: “The historical mission of the weak and little Uruguay, located between powerful and hostile neighbors, is to“ maintain balance ”between Argentina and Brazil” 13. When in the 1930s from Buenos Aires to Montevideo, Yuaska was transferred, Montevideo was also called Little Moscow 14.

But the fact of the matter is that in 2018 we will celebrate the 75th anniversary recovery relations between the USSR and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Again, in the Great Patriotic War, in 1943, Uruguay became the first in this matter in South America. But before that, he recognized the USSR at all the first. But then he tore off the relationship.

What went wrong in the relationship of Moscow with the capital, the significance of which was recognized both in tsarist and Soviet times? What led to the fact that at the turn of 1935-1936, Soviet diplomats accredited in Montevideo were forced to pack their suitcases? Is it only about domestic political reasons?

Looking ahead, one cannot fail to note the colossal work that my colleague, William Vaak 15. Being the main work by the observer of the Brazilian television Globa, he achieved access to the materials of the Comintern (in the current Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), which were then again classified. Nevertheless, he was inclined precisely to the reporting approach in working with so, pushing away from the fact that during a search in Yuzhamtorg in 1930, ship-telegrams with five-digit codes characteristic of the Comintern were discovered in Buenos Aires, which indicates that he remained captive of the statements of the Government of Brazil and Uruguay 1935-1936 that through the Permanent Protection of the USSR and the Yuzhamtorg office in Montevideo, the uprising led by the Communist Preza in Brazil was carried out. That is, here it is: and the foreign policy cause of the breakdown. Meanwhile, as it will be shown, now this version Lost almost all of its meaning.

And yet, I think, it will be more correct to start with a brief review of that by whom dealt with the USSR in the then Uruguay: from the fact that if there were “rulers of minds” (and they, of course, were), then, in turn, which Doctrinal Hobbies owned their minds. And, of course, to what actions These doctrines were brought.

Struggle and mixing of ideas

In the first half of the twentieth century, the majority of Latin America noted the first century of independent existence. A symbol of progress in Uruguay was the name of the “centenary” (“Santenario”) a brand new football stadium, at which in 1930 the first Cup of the World of FIFA was held.

By the way, an interesting detail. Having previously won the football tournament of the 1924 summer Olympics, Uruguay’s “Heavenly team” (as it was called because of the “branded” heavenly blue color of the T-shirts) was a lot of saddened that the organizers did not find notes of the Uruguayan anthem.Instead of the anthem, a certain tango was performed. For Uruguayans, this, of course, was an unnecessary illustration of the fact that in the outside world they are known about their young and ambitious republic. One of the tools with which Uruguay decided to disseminate knowledge about himself in the outside world was. The League of nations. So, in Montevideo they achieved that the league delegation arrived at their World Cup 16. In other words, Uruguay then in many ways was a “opener” country. In general, looking back, in relation to that period, on the shores of La Plata, they talk about the “apogee” 17.

And even in such quasi -European states as Uruguay, there is what is characteristic of Latin America: “passionarity” 18, “passionate love” for politics 19, willingness to express their “feelings” in it 20.

No wonder when the rest of the world, the duels were a thing of the past, even in 1920, a real duel at the pistols between the deputy and the editor-in-chief of the PAS newspaper Washington Beltran (Blanco Party) and the ex-president of the republic and the founder of the newspaper took place in Montevideo. Dia ”Jose Batge-i-Ordoneses (Kolorado party) 21. The essence of their dispute remained in the past. But the place of the duel. Batge and Beltran were not firing somewhere, but in the central circle of the stadium of the Naconal football club 22, which was located on the field sacred to each Uruguayan: where in 1811 Jose Hervasio Artigas was called the leader of the rebels against the Spanish colonial yoke 23.

This is generally such a feature. Almost all Latin American politicians, diplomats, the military at all times proved their case, calling on their side the “spirit” of the founding fathers. In Cuba – Jose Marty, in general in all of Latin America – Simon Bolivar, in Uruguay – Artigas.

Take, for example, the K Colorado party dominated in the then Uruguayan life. Her bright representative as Jose Serrato (the president of the republic in 1923-1927, in which the republic first established a diplomatic municipality with the USSR, and the Foreign Minister in 1943-1945 when restoring relations) even connected with the teachings of Bolivar (about “one Only nation in Latin America) Pan Americanism of the Monroe doctrine 24. And back in 1920, the previous President of Uruguay Baltasar Brum (and the future chairman of his National Administrative Council, on whose initiative, diplomatic municipality will be established), according to which the US retreat from isolationism in 1917 proved the desire to protect rights and independence All American countries. According to Brum, the panmericanism “meant the equality of all sovereignty, large and small” 25. The Uruguayan historian Dante Turkatti believes that it was Broum that turned Uruguay into the “most American country of that era” 26, interpreting the Monroe doctrine as “the continuation of the ideas of artgasis” 27.

However, as we see, this ostentatious Uruguayan Panmericanism did not obscure in the case of rapprochement and with the USSR.And we will put ourselves in the place of Uruguayans, about whom we have already noted that they are always trying to balance between Argentina and Brazil, which means that they need additional points of the support. What was their ostentatious “Americanophilism” very useful for them? Firstly, at the 1933 Pan American conference, it was the president – the owner of the meeting, Uruguayan G. Terr, insisted on the unanimous adoption of the Convention on the rights and obligations of states. It enshrined the principle of US non -interference in the internal affairs of the independent states of the Western hemisphere 28.

Secondly, this allowed Uruguay to lead himself to the brackets of endless discussions in the League of Nations about the need to cancel Article XXI of her Charter (she contained a link to the Monroe doctrine, which really opposed Latin America such as Argentina, which at the same time claimed a permanent place in the League Council). As a result, on a shameful basis, but regularly Latin America at the League Council represented Uruguay. This first happened back in September 1922. Thanks to the skillful diplomacy of her delegate, Juan Antonio Bueero, the smallest in the population of the South American Republic, was again and again elected to the Council in 1923, 1924 and 1925 29.

The Uruguayan diplomatic mission in Geneva became a real “forge of personnel”: in 1923, Montevideo in Geneva was represented by Juan Jose de Mesaga (the future president, in which diplomatic mission with the USSR will be restored during the Second World War). Since the mid-1920s, Alberto Guani entered the Uruguayan delegation (he became the chairman of the Assembly 30 in the League, and in his country-the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Vice President; in 1942 he will be in Washington to negotiate with Litvin to restore diplomitions). As a result of this constructive position of Uruguay, against the backdrop of the absence of Argentina and Brazil in the League and the loyal position of such small countries as Uruguay (and also Cuba), since 1926, the representative office of Latin America in the Council “has been increased from one to three unstable members” 31.

Such Uruguayan pragmatism (and, as a result, influence) were very valuable in the League for the USSR. It is worth recalling that by that time the Bolsheviks considered finally consolidated power to be fundamentally important so that the USSR was not requested membership in the league, but the league invited him. In this regard, it was necessary to take care of the support of 2/3 of the participants in the Assembly 32. So, the voices of the Latin American, who represented most of the then independent non -European countries there were fundamentally important. On July 2, 1934, Litvinov wrote to Stalin that “probe in Geneva” shows that “Latin America will not mind even against providing the USSR in the Council” 33. As a result, as many as four states of the region (Chile, Haiti, Mexico and the same Uruguay) were among the countries that signed the letter with the invitation of the USSR to League 34.

However, the membership in the League of Nations ceased to be for Uruguay by the answer to new challenges that the Great Depression brought.

For 1929-1933, the prices for the key for Uruguay for Uruguay, meat, fell three times 35, and export was reduced by 65% 36. This was added to this that at the 1932 conference in Ottawa the United Kingdom agreed on the so -called “imperial preferences”: privileged trade with British dominions, but not with Uruguay, which had previously used the same impurities 37.

As a result, in Montevideo we went to a radical revision of the usual coordinate system in foreign trade and foreign policy. The Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of Uruguay of 1932 read: “With the freedom of international trade, it is actually finished, and so far it is not to restore it – which, unfortunately, does not depend on us. We are forced to agree with the formula Selling to the one who bought.

Who will buy? Who will help? Firstly, they decided in Montevideo – Germany. Thus, a loan from the Germans allowed to start the construction of the strategic for the Republic of the Rincon-del Bonet hydroelectric power station on the Rio Negro River, which was marked by the exchange of telegrams between President Terra and Hitler 38. In the same year, they even intended to purchase in Germany in Montevideo, instead of British. This did not happen only due to the presence of a rigidly prescribed position of the Anglo-Uruguayan trade agreement, according to which Uruguay was obliged to cover 97.2% of his needs 39 by British coal.

An interesting plot was that on January 5, 1935, the official Montevideo acted as an author of the idea of how exactly in the Uruguayan direction to bring the interests of Berlin and Moscow closer. In the conversation of the Minister of Finance of Uruguay Charlona with the USSR envoy Minkin, even the following was discussed: “We started talking about the message that appeared recently in the local press about the purchase of RZH (or oats) in Lithuania, and Lithuania allegedly accepted our payment obligations issued by Germany. In this regard, the minister put forward such a scheme: the Germans need Uruguayan wool, Uruguay needs our goods, we have German payment obligations. Is it possible through us by wool to pay our duty to Germany by delivering here in return for the wool of our goods? ” 40

What kind of goods did the USSR supplied to Uruguay then? First of all, oil. However, despite the fact that the answer to this question sounds, at least, traditionally, this plot requires a retreat.

Uruguayan National Fuel

One of the symbols of Uruguay is a pumpkin into which the Uruguayans constantly pour boiling water from the thermos and suck the Mate Tea through a special tube. The most magical properties are attributed to this tea: reduces cholesterol, tones, gives strength. But, of course, the gas tank can’t be tucked with the MATE.

Even in his first full-fledged presidency, Jose Batja-I-Ordones (who is not reasonably called the founding father of modern Uruguay)* (* Batge-i-Ordonez Torkuato, Jose Pablo (05/21/1856.10.1929)-son of President Lorenso Bate, and the son of President Lorenso, and . about.President in 1899 (as the chairman of the Senate in the transition period) and the elected president of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay from the Colorado party in 1903-1907. and 1911-1915, chairman of the National Administrative Council in 1921-1923. and 1927-1928 The dynasty was continued by the presidents of Batge Berres and Batge Ibanyes.) Buried by the creation of his own “national fuel” from alcohol in the country. For this reason, in 1906, he turned to parliament with the initiative to introduce a monopoly on alcohol 41. In his second presidency, by his decree of October 22, 1912, he established the Institute of Geology and Drilling and the Institute of Industrial Chemistry. They were given the task of studying the question of whether or cannot be obtained in the country what would be called “national fuel” 42. In the editorial article in the Dia newspaper, Batge wrote in 1919: “Every year the republic transports alcohol, kerosene and gasoline for 6 million pesos abroad. A significant part of the gold that we receive for our goods leaves us immediately … You can free yourself from these payments, making fuel ourselves ”43.

Batge's calls had a specific basis. The climatic conditions and soils of Uruguay are quite suitable for growing sugarcane, which is a raw material for production, including alcohol. It is curious, by the way, that now it again has become an integral part of the government program: in 2015, President Tabarea Vasquez (Wide Front), which provides a very successful program to create an alternative energy cluster, announced the priority of raising sugarcane in 2015.

The current Uruguayan authorities have something to rely on. Back in 1917, a substance called “green oil” was received in the country, akin to today's ethanol. As an experiment, this substance was seasoned with a car that was able to overcome 50 km 44. However, this did not solve the problem of energy self -sufficiency: “green oil” had to be mixed with ordinary gasoline (in the experiment mentioned above the experiment was 50:50). Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Uruguay, the issue of expanding the mass production of biofuel was increasingly being discussed in Uruguay, at the same time to acquire their own capacities according to the distillation of ordinary oil 45. To this end, at the beginning of 1931, the Uruguayan Society of Fuel was created. However, at first it claimed only 16% of the oil refining market, which did not lead to conflict with branches of oil companies from Britain and the USA 46. However, by October 1931, after Argentina 47 and in Uruguay, its own state monopoly for oil refining – the National Administration for Fuel, Alcohols and Cement (ANCAP). The corresponding law received No. 8.764.

This was the reason for the boycott for the supply of oil products from Britain and the United States to Uruguay. Against this background, in 1929, the Uruguayans made a proposal to the Soviet Yuzhamtorg about the creation of the country's first oil refinery and the supply of raw materials for it.

On the one hand, the volume of these supplies should not be exaggerated.President in 1899 (as the chairman of the Senate in the transition period) and the elected president of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay from the Colorado party in 1903-1907. and 1911-1915, chairman of the National Administrative Council in 1921-1923. and 1927-1928 The dynasty was continued by the presidents of Batge Berres and Batge Ibanyes.) Buried by the creation of his own “national fuel” from alcohol in the country. For this reason, in 1906, he turned to parliament with the initiative to introduce a monopoly on alcohol 41. In his second presidency, by his decree of October 22, 1912, he established the Institute of Geology and Drilling and the Institute of Industrial Chemistry. They were given the task of studying the question of whether or cannot be obtained in the country what would be called “national fuel” 42. In the editorial article in the Dia newspaper, Batge wrote in 1919: “Every year the republic transports alcohol, kerosene and gasoline for 6 million pesos abroad. A significant part of the gold that we receive for our goods leaves us immediately … You can free yourself from these payments, making fuel ourselves ”43.

On the one hand, the volume of these supplies should not be exaggerated.For the Soviet oil industry, they represented the minimum export segment through Yuzhamtorg: in the operations of Neftesindikat in 1927-1928, the share of Yuzhamtorg was 5499 tons, or only 0.2% of physical sales and 0.39% of cash receipts 49 . On the other hand, according to, for example, the Uruguayan historian M. Rodriguez Isager, “the presence of [Soviet oil] lifted the spirit of the patriots who saw in [these] deliveries a counterbalance to dependence on oil trusts” 50 .

Thus, the thesis put forward by Litvinov, that oil is the biggest trump card in our game with the world bourgeoisie, and we must play it with maximum political advantage 51 was fully justified.

An additional incentive for the development of Soviet-Uruguayan trade was the fact that, against the background of the currency control introduced in Uruguay with the onset of the Great Depression, Moscow was ready to trade with Montevideo not only in hard currency, but also in the national currency. Article 6 of the Agreement between the NKVT of the USSR and the Bank of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay dated June 17, 1935 explicitly stated that “90% of the exports of the Uruguayan JSC Yuzhamtorg can be reimbursed with Uruguayan pesos” (that is, “pesos”) 52 .

Naturally, against this background, it is impossible not to return to the role played in Uruguay by the left forces, and especially by the communists.

Struggle and confusion of ideas. Communists

Of course, on the one hand, according to the absolutely fair remark of the leading Russian Latin Americanist, director of the ILA RAS V.M. life of the countries of the region” 53 . On the other hand, the Communist Party of the Communist Party is different. About the KPU, the ECCI quite rightly noted that it is “the only one on the continent … having for a long time its own newspaper and parliamentary representation” 54 and even its own sports club “Atlético Soviet” 55 .

Moreover, against the background of the almost complete absence of a network of diplomatic missions in Latin America in the pre-war USSR, it was the communist parties that were assigned the role of a kind of “permanent missions” of Moscow.At least, this is how the ruling elites of the same Uruguay perceived it. Thus, the documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs contain a remarkable reference to the words of Uruguay's Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the USSR Masanes, who in 1935 noted that according to the Uruguayan government, the Comintern, due to the interests of the Soviet state, is forced to refrain from active work in Europe, but since he needs someone to rely on, he does this in the South American states” 56 .

On the one hand, according to such connoisseurs of the legacy of the Comintern as N.S. Lebedeva and M.M. Narinsky, he, of course, was “an obedient instrument of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally I. Stalin” 57 . As the Communist Party newspaper Khustisia put it, the voice of Moscow is always right 58 . But, on the other hand, such communist parties of small countries of Latin America as the Communist Party of Ukraine were ready and, let’s say, creatively (and even freely) to rework what, for example, the son of a prominent party leader, Uruguayan historian Gerardo Leibner, now working in Israel, calls turns and deep mutations in the course of Moscow 59 .

Let's get personal. Who was, for example, the leader of the Communist Party, Eugenio Gomez? As they say now, his “background” is a hairdresser from the provincial city of Minas. Then he was the leader of the Port Workers Union of Montevideo 60 . At the same time, it is characteristic that he took a very specific party pseudonym for a communist – “Artigas”. On the one hand, the founding father of the country, Artigas, was the author of the “Instructions of the XIII Year” (1813), revolutionary for his time, which suggested a radical land reform in the country. On the face of it, the communist Gomez might have meant just that. But on the other hand, Artigas was nothing more than a Separatist. He was the creator of the rebellious, unwilling to submit to the central authorities in Buenos Aires, the Federal League of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata, including the eastern bank of the Uruguay 61 .

Thus, the internationalist communist Gomez, who took the pseudonym Artigas, found himself on the same side with the Uruguayans.Nationalists from the Blanco Right Party, who made the standard of Artigas with his party banner (namely the leader of this party, Senator Luis Alberto de Errera, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, will tell the phrase that all Latino-American-nationalists will be taken into circulation Supporters of neutrality: “Let yellow and blondes from the north understand each other” 62). That is, on the one hand, Gomez-“Artigas” made a proletarian unity and, for example, sent his one-party members to disseminate the ideas of proletarian internationalism to the fronts of the Bolivian-Paraginal War of 1932-1935. But on the other hand, in the Uruguayan direction, Gomez was forced to take into account the mood of his society, the electorate, which always with great scrupulousness treated (and refers) to issues of national identity, self -preservation.

And she, national identity, led to the fact that at the turn of the 1920-1930s, Uruguayan domestic policy committed several unexpected turns.

Communists ─ Friends of Putchists

Anyone who is in Montevideo lead to the central area of independence. There is the Mausoleum of Artigas, there is the old and new palaces of the presidents, there are the remnants of the main gate in the former colonial square -toe. In the alignment of these gates – Sarandi Street, which leads to paradise for experts in the Masonic symbols of the old city, to the kingdom of Bukinists and merchants the only useful, sloping country – Amethysts. But back to the square. It is carved by giant palm trees. Depending on the time of the year, these noble trees either strive in the whitish now (due to the “ozone hole”) of the southern heavens, or rest on the ceiling of sullen winter fogs. But neither summer evaporation, nor winter fogs, nor palm trees are able to close the view of the main attraction of the area. Once the highest skyscraper in South America Palaceio Salvo is fascinating today. Eclectic, but – masterpiece!If he is saddened by something, then by the plates adopted in Latin America, which are both “in commemoration” and, let’s say, “memorial and funeral.” The tablets say that this place was a bar where they composed and first performed the tango Kumparsita. An instantly recognizable melody – for all time. But the bar has been demolished.

Who knows? Maybe in the ranks of the Communist Party there was a frequenter of that particular bar? Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why in 1930 the Communist Party newspaper Khustisia wrote about this wonderful skyscraper as a symbol. built on sorrow and the sweat of the exploited” 63 .

Twists – twists. Well, what essentially what then were the claims of the Uruguayan communists to their authorities? In the first half of the 20th century, the Uruguayan left, socialists and communists, for the first time shook the seemingly eternal two-party system, consisting of the Blanco and Colorado parties (simplistically, “conservatives from the provinces and liberals from Montevideo”) 64 .Indeed, if at the first stage of its existence the KPU was also subject to the “childhood disease of leftism in communism”, it sided with the anarchists (on the issue of the need to destroy

and

capitalism,

and

state) 65 and refused parliamentary forms of struggle 66 , then by 1925 she decided to “change the gun for a ballot” 67 (which could not but be a temptation under the extremely liberal proportional electoral system operating in Uruguay, about which – a little later) 68 . As a result, since 1925 the CPU has always had parliamentary mandates 69 . In particular, in 1925, Mibelli, Gomez 70 and Lasarra 71 became deputies of the House of Representatives from the Communist Party of Ukraine from the very first attempt.

Nevertheless, after a couple of years, the twists again made themselves felt. The party went to the 1928 elections under the slogan Class against class: the poor against the rich! 72 . By 1929, Gomez went even further, saying that an objectively revolutionary situation had matured in the country.

And yet, the liberal Uruguayan legislation not only kept the CPU on a legal platform, but even made it possible to transfer SASC to Montevideo from Buenos Aires.In 1929, in Montevideo, an employee of the Comintern, Swiss Jules Umbert-Bros, described in a letter to his wife atmosphere of the liberal and democratic Uruguay: “As for the police control, then … Anyone enters and leaves without presenting papers and calling himself as he wants. There is no control inside at all. This is a real paradise for “dealers of our type” ”74. Such a unique state of affairs led to the fact that already at the early stage the volume of financing of the Communist Party of the smallest South American Republic – Uruguay is comparable with the volume of financing where more than more than 75 countries are 75. The Translation of Yuasky from Buenos Aires to Montevideo was associated with the displacement of the president of Argentina Iprilo Iriguen and the subsequent (no matter how strange these two adjectives together) of the anti-liberal and anti-communist turn of the new authorities.However, soon the “coupling test” was to Uruguay: on March 31, 1933, the Parliament and the National Administrative Council (CNA) were dissolved by President Terra. What was the case? According to the very democratic Constitution of 1919, “the most advanced and enlightened country of South America” 76, Uruguay, turned out to be a republic, where “an institutional experiment unprecedented in the world” was also launched: the supreme executive branch became “dualistic”. The rather wonderful design of the executive branch consisted, on the one hand, from the president, and on the other, from the collegial national administrative council. And if, for example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, then economic ministries and state-owned enterprises, like the ANCAP oil-spire corporation, subordinate to the president, subordinated CNA 78.The extremely liberal laws on this unusual constitutional structure were imposed on

Total

proportional and

two -level

The election system (when several calculations can be put forward under the banner of one batch, “subleum”). In the case of the presidential election, this meant that the head of state became the candidate from the subscription, which gained the largest number of votes within the list of the winning party.As a result, in 1930, a paradoxical situation developed in Uruguay. The Catholic-conservative of Terra, which became the head of state, represented only one of the three “sublems” as a whole of the liberal and even atheistic Party “Colorado”. At the same time, in absolute numbers, Terra received significantly fewer votes than Senator de Errera (the main candidate from the Blanco Offense Party, which at the same time received less votes than Colorado) 79.

In turn, the “liberal” faction “Colorado” (the so -called “pure Batjeists”) had a majority in CNA. Their main answer to the great depression is the statehood of the economy. So, in 1930-1932, the number of civil servants in the republic increased from 30 thousand to 52 80. By the way, it is worth noting that such a state of affairs in Uruguay was fixed for a long time: in June 1944, the head of the newly opened Soviet diplomatic mission in Montevideo S.A. Orlov reported to the NKKIA (referring, however, to the American newspaper New York Times) that she calls Uruguay “the most socialist country in the world after the USSR, for the greatest percentage of the country's economy is concentrated in the hands of the state” 81. The debates about the value and paths of the public sector reform are in Uruguay to this day.

In other words, in the early 1930s, the constitutional system of checks and counterweights turned into Uruguay, rather, into the web of ideological and (which is more dangerous) political contradictions in the elites. Namely: looking around, the new president of the Colorado party Gabriel Terra realized that the true ideological ally for him is the leader of the Blanco party, Senator Errera, and not a single-party liberal. With him, they organized an anti-constitutional coup: by the army and police, but, it turned out, with inter-party support. The parliament and CNA were dissolved. At the same time, both the deepest impression on the political class and on ordinary citizens made suicide, which, in protest against the coup on March 31, 1933, was committed by the ex-president of the republic and CNA, the “pure Batzhist” Balthasar Brum 82.

Nevertheless, being the president of the democratic Uruguay, Terra, even having made a successful coup, could not afford to rule with the help of decrees. By mid -1933, he announced the election to the constitutional convention and parliament (where, under the new Constitution, a new president was elected, that is, of course, Terra himself).

But in the plebiscite, according to the new Constitution, liberals flatly refused to participate: both the “pure Batjists” of the Colorado party, and the “Blanco” party independent of the Errera. But the Communist Party decided to “take advantage of the election campaign in order to disrupt the mask from the dictatorship … and won five mandates” 83. This was the best result of the Communist Party in the national elections for all 12 years of the party. KPU clearly absorbed the voices of the protest electorate. But thus, the Communist Party participated in the legitimization of the new regime, which was unacceptable for half of voters and political class 84.It is worth noting that, according to the veiled recognition of the long -term leader of the Communist Party of Gomez, as a result, strategically the party, rather lost 85: on the one hand, it won five mandates, but on the other hand, she ceased to be truly opposition. As a result, the Communist Party had to urgently “correct the image”. On May 18, 1934, Gomez tried to disrupt the inauguration of Terra, who was elected according to the new Constitution, adopted, by the participation of the Communist Party. The leader of the socialists Frogoni also acted on that day. For shouts during the inauguration, he was detained right in the hall 86.

It should also be borne in mind that at an earlier stage, in 1932, the Communist Party put forward the idea of the “united front of the working people” 87 in her country. However, contrary to its own attitudes, but this time fulfilling the Comintern line, on May 1, 1933, the KPU even tore the rally of 88. Rearing relations now with Terra, the Communist Party finally turned out to be on one side of the barricades: on January 28, 1935, activists of both parties even became participants in the battle of Paso-Morlan, which was given to the Governmental Police Forces near the city of Rosario in the Uruguayan Department of the Department of Government. Principal opponents of Terra 89. At the same time, clashes passed in the north, closer to the border with Brazil 90.

However, the established opinion of Uruguanian historians as Raul Hakob and Juan Oddon, that the gap of Terra followed this not only with Uruguayan Communists, but also with the USSR was part of his

domestic political

, The “Spanistic” conservative turn of 91, should now be refuted: against the background of declassifying the Uruguayan diplomatic correspondence of that period. Communists-diplomats and just communistsUruguay went back to the establishment and development of relations with the Soviet foreign trade organization “Yuzhamtorg” in the mid-1920s. The “special path” of this company is also recognized in modern Russian official publications: “Since the USSR economic contacts with South American partners were extremely rare and often did not justify the organizational expenses associated with them, Yuzhamtorg employees were forced to perform work mainly by agitation and propaganda nature” 92 . Nevertheless, Yuzhamtorg operations grew. In 1928, in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper, the chairman of the board of Yuzhamtorg B.I. Kraevsky said: “This year, a significant expansion of trade operations with the South American countries is planned. South American sheep, who arrived here for the first time and recognized as quite suitable for breeding in the USSR, aroused special interest here … The development of the trade of the USSR with the countries of South America is quite intensively. So, for example, in the first year of trade relations with South America, in 1925/26, the turnover of Yuzhamtorg expressed $ 4.5 million. In 1926/27, this turnover already amounted to $ 14.5 million, and for the first half of the current, 1927/28, our turnover with South America was already $ 12.5 million ”93.Moreover, if in Argentina Kraevsky had the status of just the chairman of the board

commercial companies, then in Uruguay (even before the transfer of the Central Office of Yuzhamtorg in Montevideo) was accredited as Official Torgoc -Chapter

THE USSR. At the same time, a clearly very entrepreneurial person Kraevsky managed to make the legal advisers of Yuzhamtorg in Uruguay representatives of the highest political layers.In particular, B. Brum 94 became the legal adviser to Yuzhamtorg. Soon, the supply of Nafta, that is, Soviet oil, began.

In the second half of the 1920s, a breakthrough was also connected with the activities of Yuzhamtorg in the Soviet-Uruguayan

political

relationship. In 1926, Uruguay became only the 11th state on the planet, which was established by the decree of President H. Serrato (by the way, personally familiar with G.V. Chicherin) 95 from the USSR. At the same time, contrary to the practice of negotiations with other Latin American states, the meetings of Soviet and Uruguayan diplomats were not held in a third country, but in Moscow: the Uruguayan diplomat Masansnet arrived in the USSR (in the documents of the NWKI of the USSR – Mazanes) 96. Thus, it was the Uruguayans who were the first to respond to an interview with 1924 of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Chicherin with the Argentinean newspaper La Nacion that the “initiative of any South American country” on the issue of establishing relations with the USSR “would have met understanding and support from our part” 97.

For the above considerations, the eminent Uruguayan lawyer (who at different periods of the Foreign Ministry and ambassador at the Gaga International Court) Ector Gros Espiel owns an elegant definition that the relationship was not broken in 1917-1926, but only “deprived of continuation” 98.

However, in turn, the former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation I.S. Ivanov has a much more restrained definition that in 1926 the USSR agreed to establish Relations, “based solely for reasons of international political prestige” 99.

Nevertheless, correspondence to the NCCI on the issue of the transfer of Yuzhamtorg from Argentina to Uruguay testifies that such a “prestige” turned out to be at a certain moment very incidentally: “the raid and defeat of Yuzhamtorg [in 1931 in Argentina] with active interest The People's Commissariat of Complex in a number of trade operations in South America is necessary for the restructuring of our work … Discussion of the coming work in South America led the collegium of the NKKI and the People's Commissariat of Hall to the conclusion that it would be the most correct to transfer the center of trade operations to Uruguay … ”100

But already through a short pause in the USSR, when evaluating these relations, only filled with specific content, for the first time the above restrained (and even skeptical) position arose. A month before the breakdown of the relationship, Uruguay in his letter to Stalin Litvinov was even more pessimistic: “We have no business interests that justify the existence of the Soviet mission in … Latin American countries. We have a representative office in Uruguay, with which we are completely unnecessary due to the lack of any business relations and interests ”101.

At first glance, such an assessment is amazing. If the translation of Yuasky from Buenos Aires to Montevideo was a secondary interest for the NKID, then the transfer of the Yuzhamtorg representative office there and the quickly creating a full -fledged diplomatic mission on its basis was, in theory, a much more significant event – an important element of the “breakthrough of the diplomatic blockade”. The decision to move to Montevideo Yuzhamtorg was made in 1931 at the Politburo level 102. In the same year, in the telegram of Kalinin addressed to the President of Uruguay Terra, the relationship was called “so happily established” 103. On November 6, 1933, President Terra signed credentials to General Eduardo da Kostya as the first Uruguayan envoy to the USSR. Having handed his trendy letters on March 10, 1934, Costa immediately began negotiations on the opening of Uruguayan consulates or vice counselors in Odessa, Leningrad and Batumi, through the ports of which the Uruguayans wanted to establish the supply of Soviet forests 104. Also on March 10, 1934, Terre in Montevideo presented his trendy letters of Terre in Montevideo A. Minkin, who, therefore, became both the trade and the USSR diplomatic representative in Uruguay.

Against this background, at first glance, Soviet-Uruguayan relations should have acquired more and more depths. Instead, a crisis. Why?

In fact, by the end of 1935, Soviet-Uruguayan relations became hostages of the strategy that Brazil and the United States carried out in South America.

For a better understanding of these international processes, one must still pay attention to the intra -Wrike political conjuncture.

Oil translated

Let us return to the circumstances of the adoption of the 1931 law on the creation of the Uruguayan Gosmonopoli Ancap.

They signed the law, as expected, the chairman of the parliament Juan B. Morelly and secretary Martin Genuzhen. But the true authors of him were two other deputies from the liberal “Batja” faction of the Colorado party: the future president of the Republic Batge Berres and Gonzalez Vidart. At the same time, the opposition from that faction of the Blanco party, headed by L.A. De Herrera, were unhappy with the creation of Ancap corporation, as such. They accused the Batjists of Sovietization of the Uruguayan economy and Leninism, which refuses a private initiative 105. However, the liberal minority of the Blanco Party, on the contrary, greeted the Batjeists, believing that “the law stimulates agriculture”, since “alcohol would be made of corn and sweet potatoes” 106.

Such “mezalians” between the fractions within the same batch and, on the contrary, the interfraction alliances between different batches, of course, introduced additional confusion into the domestic political processes of Uruguay. But this was not even the main systemic problem. The ANCAP law introduced an additional intrigue in the executive branch, depriving president Terra of control over the most important sector of the economy.

As a result, the law became a catalyst for events on March 31, 1933, when Terra dismissed the parliament and CNA, switched to a sole rule and, in particular (albeit preserving Ancap), blurred its monopoly, reaching reconciliation with British and American oil industry workers. It is curious that even after that in the Uruguayan dialect of the Spanish language, the word “gasoline” sounds like “naphtha”, that is, in tune with the Russian “oil”. But at that moment it turned more rather into a historical phenomenon.

Different vectors

It is amazing that it was the arranged anti -constitutional revolution, who imprisoned the Socialist Frogoni in prison on the island of the flowers of the socialist Frogoni and blurred the monopoly of the Soviet “Nafta” President Terra raised relations with the USSR to the level of exchange of embassies.It seems that all this, and the quick, no less unexpected break in relations, reflected an amazing combination of purely “passionate” considerations (which in Latin America, after all, should not be forgotten for a minute), and purely rational reasons. What?

So, after the coup, the “pure batjists” demanded that Terra restore the constitutional order. But in the eyes of the left forces, the exchange of diplomatic missions with the USSR became a kind of indulgence for dictatorship. By promising an exchange of embassies with the USSR, Terra achieved the participation of the small but visible KPU and SPU in legitimizing his regime. However, by the time the decision was made to raise the degree in relations with the USSR, support from the left for Terra was no longer a matter of principle. Moreover, they themselves went over to the side of the irreconcilable opposition, participating in the “Battle of Paso Morlan”.Meanwhile, under the new Constitution, not only did the National Administrative Council disappear in the country, but the Senate was formed in a completely new way. In it, according to the new rules, mandates were distributed only between the two parties that received the largest number of votes. This provided Terra with sole executive power and support from the nationalist Herrera in parliament. Herrera, already controlling the majority in the Blanco party, became its only parliamentary leader (the dissidents of the party, we repeat, did not participate in the elections). At the same time, in the plebiscite of 1933, according to the Constitution, almost 50% took part, and in the elections of the new parliament – all 58% of voters. That is, the question of the legitimacy of the new political structure was successfully resolved.

The orientation towards this majority can be considered the second reason why Terra went in 1933 to increase the level of relations with the USSR – even against the background of the fact that the Communists had already played their role. Apparently, Terra, having successfully overcome political and constitutional problems, now needed a breakthrough in the economy, which had experienced the shock of the Great Depression at the beginning of the decade.American historian Robert Levin about the exchange of diplomatic mission Uruguay with the USSR notes: “There is no doubt about the pragmatic nature of this initiative: the discovery of new markets for Uruguayan exporters, due to the difficulties of great depression. In the end, the United States just went to the same measure. * (* Diplomatic relations of the United States and the USSR are established on November 16, 1933) everything that … took care is to sell meat, skin and wool. 107. According to Levin, the initiative of the imminent rupture of diplomatic agents also came from Uruguay 108. In fact, as it becomes completely clear now, the main factor was the main thing.

In the decree of the Terra government on the breakdown of relations with the USSR, it was stated that the Soviet mission “grown” from “Yuzhamtorg” in Montevideo “incited and provided their assistance to the communist elements of a neighboring state” 109, that is, Brazil. The question was raised that Soviet representatives in Uruguay sent and (most importantly) Financed The Brazilian communist Preza, who was led by large -scale November riots in Brazil. The Montevideo, who then prompted the rupture of relations with Moscow, the Ambassador of Brazil to Uruguay L. Bueno claimed that Yuzhamtorg is actually “controlled by the desires and orders of the III International” 110. Moreover, the Brazilian diplomats claimed that the uprising was inspired by the performance of Dutch Van Mina at the VII Congress of the Comintern. It was argued that this “Dutchman” said that the Communist Party of Brazil follows “secret instructions from the Soviet mission to Montevideo” 111. In fact, Van Ming is not a Dutchman, but a Chinese 112, who, although he oversaw Latin America, never made such a speech 113.

Nevertheless, as it is definitely understandable today, the Comintern 114 really stood behind the organization of the November uprising in Brazil. J. Vargas did not hide her rejection and the “anchor” now for the Uuask Communist Party Uruguay. So, back in 1934, the KPU printed body put forward the slogan Down with Uvatuliu Vargas! 115.

However, the thesis about the involvement of any Soviet and pro -Soviet structures located in Uruguay (KPU, Yuasky, Yuzhamtorg, diplomatic mission) in
financing

The uprising in Brazil does not withstand criticism. On the one hand, of course, there is a encryption, which, before the closing of the corresponding inventories of the RGASPI, managed to study (and even publish in his book by her facsimile) my Brazilian colleague V.Vaac. We are talking about a message dated November 27, 1935, when the ICCA secretariat instructed Yuasky and the Communist Party: “We translate twenty -five thousand telegrapho. Keep us in the course of events. That is, the content of this document indicates: at least, co -financing of the uprising of Moscow is a fact.On the other hand, in the section “Method of Communication” “No. 20” 116 was indicated – which does not mean Uruguay in any way. This can be asserted, given that the author of the most detailed study on the cipher correspondence of the Comintern F. Firsov placed “No. 20” in other categories. In one of the options, this number falls into the transfer of financial terms and the names of the currencies: “14 – pesets, 15 – Florins, 16 – French francs, 17 – dollar, 18 – Swiss francs, 19 – pound of Sterling, 21 – Courier, and 20 – “Cangé (?) [Apparently, the distortion of the word“ h ”(vacation)” 117. Of course, we can assume that Uruguay was meant under “Congé”. But in the appendix “Numerical [country] codes” in the book of F. Firsov under “No. 20” we mean China and all the same Congé. The meaning of this term, obviously, was known only to the then encryptions. But this is definitely not Uruguay. Uruguay appears in the lists as numbers 60 and 67, the Latin American secretariat – 15, the South American Bureau – 27,118.Thus, one can say: KPU and Yuasky in Uruguay, of course,

interacted

with the CPB, but as for

financing
The uprisings of the Comintern (which was blamed the Soviet side by the Terra government), then it did not go through Yuzhamtorg or the Soviet diplomatic mission in Montevideo, but in some other way.

But what happened next in 1935-1936?

Vocabulary and vocabulary

As for the position of the Soviet side, then on December 10

1935 Polkatemkin reported to Moscow that “according to the information received … the special commission was studying in the State Bank, the financial transactions of Yuzhamtorg 119. As it became known from the declassified correspondence of the Brazil of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Ministry of Uruguay, published by A.M.Driges Aisager, the Brazilian ambassador to Uruguay Bueno, in turn, reported to Rio de Janeiro, which he received information from the head of the Uruguayan General Gomez, That the Soviet mission in Montevideo received 100 thousand dollars for propaganda. However, the corresponding report of the Montevideo police investigation department (which monitored the transfer of money to the Soviet mission and Yuzhamtorg) also mentioned 120 is also mentioned in the also discovered report by Rodriguez Aisagger.

Nevertheless, on December 27, Montevideo informed the envoy of the breakdown of relations with Moscow. The envoy Minkin the next day sent a note to Uruguay Espalter Foreign Minister, in which the “most categorically” stated that “the USSR mission in Uruguay always performed exclusively and strictly only those functions that are provided and allowed by international public law” 121. But this note was returned to Minkin already as a “private person, devoid of diplomatic accreditation” 122, and he was forced to leave Montevideo.

The Uruguayan government continued to “accept the statements of the Brazilian government” 123, and the story with the expulsion of the USSR diplomatic mission became part of the World Anti -Soviet Wave. In particular, in January 1936, Spain's right -wing seal supported the most radical version of events related to the collective signing by all ministers of the President of the President of Terra 124 Decree on the expulsion of the USSR plenipotence: “The Soviets received what they deserved. [The Soviet Envoy in Montevideo] by the end of [1935] was preparing a revolution in all of South America ”125. The right Spanish newspaper Epka under the heading of Soviet morals also increased the ordinary (under ordinary circumstances) information that the Polkatykin “left Montevideo from Montevideo in a first -class cabin – while the rest of the staff … went to the third” 126. Even Australian 127 echoed the right Spanish press.

In Moscow, this issue was considered at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The report of its chairman stated: “If you believe the gentlemen of the Uruguayans, then you might think that the Soviet government has nothing more to do than the internal affairs of Brazil and Uruguay, in which the gentlemen of the Brazilian and Uruguayan rulers, apparently, do not understand well if they blame their troubles on others. However, the Soviet government cannot pass by such acts, even if by Uruguay, which are not only completely unfounded in relation to our state, but are also a direct violation of the Pact of the League of Nations, which includes both the USSR and Uruguay.

Indirect confirmation that the public surprise of the top Soviet leadership by Montevideo's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Moscow reflected sincere bewilderment is contained in the internal correspondence between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the ECCI. In particular, even in 1937, D. Ibarruri's secretariat assumed that a serious role in breaking off relations with the USSR was played by the ambassador not of Brazil, but of Italy 129 . Judging by Litvinov's letter to the Soviet embassy in Rome, he too was initially inclined to the idea of Italy's decisive role in the Soviet-Uruguayan diplomatic crisis 130 . Only the version about the role of Germany was not considered. In 1945, the Soviet investigator, Senior Lieutenant Mikheev, interrogated Hans Morato (who was the Reich Ambassador to Uruguay at the time of the break in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Montevideo). But that period of the German diplomat's career was not of interest to the Soviet authorities 131 .

One of the most interesting documents of the end of 1935 is the “Record of the conversation of comrade. Stern with [Romanian envoy] Cianu Pavel dated 12/29/1935”, which reads: “Cianu told me that [Charge d'Affaires of Uruguay in the USSR] Masanes was supposed to be at the dinner. He, however, refused due to a break in relations. Chianu was talking to Masanes about the rupture… Chianu was very interested in how we want to refer the issue of severance to the League of Nations, since he does not know which article of the League of Nations pact can be used” 132 . It is possible that Chianu probed the soil at the request of the Uruguayans, but at that time did not learn anything.

Through a short pause, in January 1936, the position of the Soviet government was brought to the whole world. On behalf of the CEC, the NKKU prepared an appeal to the general secretary of the League of Nations, referring to §1 of Art. 12 and §2 Art. 11 of the Charter of the League 133, and demanded to introduce this on the agenda of the nearest session, since “the claims that caused the gap, Uruguay did not submit to the arbitration or the league advice” 134.

When the question reached the league on January 25, 1936, the Uruguayan delegate Guani said that we are talking about legitimate protection in case of threat of internal order 135. To this, Litvinov expressed the readiness of the Soviet government to provide all the financial documentation of the embassy: “Never, I repeat, never, in any case, no evidence has been submitted in support of such accusations, except for fake documents fabricated by Russian counter -revolutionary emigrants and close to them elements. I have no doubt that the Uruguayan or fascist Brazilian governments, if they want, will not be difficult to get such documents even in Geneva herself. The demand for them in the European market has now fallen significantly, and they can probably be obtained at dumping prices. However, I must warn that I will demand the most thorough examination of such documents ”136. As for banking checks, Litvinov cited the following argument: “If the checks were transferred to Montevideo, is it so difficult to establish accurate numbers in Uruguayan banks, the amount and date of these checks?” 137

The refusal of the Uruguayan delegation to submit any evidence unexpectedly deployed to the side of Moscow even that press in the West, which at the end of 1935 enthusiastically greeted Uruguay of relations with the USSR. Litvinov noted: The Germans hoped that this analysis would turn into a judgment on the Comintern and Moscow, and, according to some of my colleagues, gloated that the Soviet government itself drove itself into the trap. Their disappointment was great when one Uruguay came out of the Geneva parsing to the shameful ”138.

Nevertheless, the effect of Litvinov's performance in the League of Nations was twofold. From a political and psychological point of view, in the eyes of small countries, Litvinov built part of his speech at least undiplomatically: , in the coup d'état of 1933, which placed its current President, Mr. Terra, in power … The history … of the Uruguayans suggests that they do not need instructions and guidance from outside to carry out the uprisings, and is it not clear that they themselves have mastered this art to perfection? 139

As a lyrical digression. Is it not from this speech of Litvinov, unfortunately, that the “lyric” of other statements on Latin America, already Molotov, grew? So, in the autumn of 1939, when discussing the problems of Soviet-Finnish relations in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Molotov said: “In his message of October 12 to Comrade. Kalinin, Mr. Roosevelt expressed his hope for the preservation and development of friendly and peaceful relations between the USSR and Finland. You might think that the United States of America is doing better with, say, the Philippines or Cuba, which have long demanded freedom and independence from the United States and cannot get them” 140 . Thus, Molotov equated the formally independent Cuba with the protectorate of the Philippines, which caused a storm of indignation in Havana.

In the summer of 1945, Molotov chose this tone when meeting in San Francisco with his Uruguayan colleague J. Serrato. Serrato says that diplomatic relations between the USSR and Uruguay were restored in 1943 … Molotov says that governments that practiced frequent breaks in diplomatic relations were not popular with the Soviet people 141 . Apparently, Molotov preferred pressure to dialogue, ignoring the fact that Serrato represented a completely different faction of the Uruguayan establishment. Finally, on October 30, 1946, Molotov declared at the UN that the United States and Haiti, the USSR and Honduras 142 should not be put on the same shelf. This has already caused a real scandal in many countries of the region.

It is interesting that back in the 1930s, the left-handed seal, uncontrolled by Moscow, also reacted to the incorrectness of such Soviet statements. In particular, in the camp of the increasingly popular in Latin America, Trotsky came to the following conclusion: “Uruguay broke diplomatic relations with the USSR. This measure was undoubtedly accepted under the pressure of Brazil and other South American countries, possibly also the United States, in the form of “warning” … But not this side of the matter is now interested in, but the behavior of the Soviet press. It is difficult to imagine a more disgusting sight! Instead of directing the thunder of its completely legitimate indignation against the powerful inspirers of the Uruguayan reaction, the Soviet seal is engaged in vulgar and stupid bullying of the small size of Uruguay, over the small number of its population, over its weakness. In the arrogant and through and through reactionary verses, Demyan, the poor, tells how he could not find without points on the map of Uruguay. At the same time, the court poet conveys the consul’s speech with all sorts of “national” accents, completely in the spirit of the Black -Hundred sharpness of royal officialders … They allow themselves all their great -power splendor to bring down the “little”, “insignificant”, “invisible on the map” Uruguay … ”143

At the same time, as it becomes clear now, the version of the financing of Moscow through Montevideo of the uprising in Brazil was only a pretext for solving the authorities of the South American countries much closer to them.

Brazil's trace. And the USA

After the “battle of Paso-Morlan”, the Uruguayan authorities asked Brazil, “so that it prevents crossing the border by people and weapons, arresting and interdesting the revolutionaries crossing the border” 144. As already noted, Uruguayan oppositionists no longer represented the real threat of power. Another thing is that, responding to a request from Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro proceeded from the fact that a much more serious Brazilian opposition was just preparing for a performance 145.

It was at the Brazilian ambassador to Montevideo L. Bueno that he referred to the Uruguayan ambassador to Rio de Janeiro Huan Carlos Blanco and the head of the Brazil Foreign Ministry of Masedo Soares 146, when he told Uruguayan diplomat that the November uprising in Brazil was governed by the Soviet mission and Yuzhamtorg in Montevideo.

Although, in response to a request from his Foreign Ministry in December 1935, the temporary attorney of Uruguay in the USSR, K. Masanes wrote: “Not a single delegate [of the Congress of the Comintern] would not be allowed to do even the most irrelevant links to Soviet diplomatic, consular or trade representatives,” events, events They developed according to the already given vector.

On Christmas, on December 25, 1935, Bueno paid a courtesy to President Terre, found him in the company of the Foreign Minister, Minister of Defense, the chiefs of the General Staff and the police and spoke about bloody events in Brazil. It was after this that the president “asked the audience whether it seems to them that American solidarity obliges Uruguay to tear out the diplomatic mission from the USSR, send a Soviet mission and deprive Yuzhamtorg of the status of a legal entity” 147.

Rodriguez Aisager, who studied Uruguay-Brazilian diplomatic correspondence, identifies three factors that played a role in the fact that, despite the lack of evidence of the guilt of the Soviet side, Uruguay still chose to go in the line of the anti-Soviet position of Brazil.

Firstly, the personal anti-communist views of the ambassador of Brazil in Uruguay. However, this one, of course, was not enough.

Secondly, referring to the “report” of Van Mina at the VII Congress of the Comintern, Minister Soarees nevertheless “confidentially told” Uruguaysky Later Blanco that “in your place I would use this to get rid of the Soviets” 148. In other words, the Brazilians did not bother with the provision of evidence, but offered the Uruguayans only a version that could become a reason for the breakdown of relations with the USSR. At the same time, on November 29, Blanco informed his Minister Espalter that these “good” wishes were accompanied by a frank blackmail: “Minister Masedo Soares … reached to tell me that Brazil could be forced to close the border with Uruguay.” 149

Finally, thirdly, Montevideo could not help but see that the story with Yuzhamtorg and the Soviet mission in Uruguay was an important trump card for Rio de Janeiro in his relationship with Washington.

Parallel intrigue

All this Soviet-Uruguayan and Uruguis-Brazilian intrigue developed against the background of a truly key episode for the entire history of the Western Hemisphere of the twentieth century. In 1932-1935, the region was shaken by the Bolivian-Paragway war, as it was believed, for the Oil region of the Chako. By the mid-1930s, the main question was this: who would lead the process of decisive settlement, which means, in the figurative expression of British diplomats, will fix the status of “Queen of South America” 150. These were either the USA or Argentina (then the rival of both the USA and Brazil).

A familiar Brazilian Foreign Ministry of Brazilian diplomacy, Luizu Albert Moniz Bandeira, familiar with the corresponding official correspondence of the Foreign Ministry, notes: “In 1935, the Ambassador of Brazil to the United States (and the future head of the Foreign Ministry) Osvaldo Arania told Summers from the State Department of the United States, which support for Brazil of the United States in matters of the central America implies mutual respect for the United States of Brazilian interests in South America ”151. In turn, Rodriguez Aisagger clarifies: “The position of Brazil regarding Argentina and Chile invitation to participate in … the commission [to resolve] in Chaco was that Brazil refused to participate in the commission if it did not enter the Uruguay (and the United States) 152.

Thus, we can say that, playing the map of the “Soviet threat” in Uruguay, Brazil positioned itself in the eyes of the United States as the main support in the fight against communism in South America, which means that it makes sense to rely on in other matters, for example, for example In mediation in Choko. In this case, Montevideo took the side of that of the regional powers bordering for him, who played a thinner party with the United States: being invited to the Commission for Settlement around Chako, not Argentina, but Brazil (with the United States).For the sake of this, obviously, it was possible to sacrifice relations with Moscow, especially against the backdrop of the fact that the main lobbyist of the development of relations with the USSR – the Communist Party went to the camp of the armed opposition, having previously provided Terre support in constitutional issues.

RIAC: The country is a "splinter". To the 80th anniversary of the break in relations between the USSR and Uruguay

Country – splinter. To the 80th anniversary of the break in relations between the USSR and Uruguay

Nuances

Struggle and mixing of ideas

Let us return to the circumstances of the adoption of the 1931 law on the creation of the Uruguayan Gosmonopoli Ancap.

with the CPB, but as for

Rodriguez Aisager, who studied Uruguay-Brazilian diplomatic correspondence, identifies three factors that played a role in the fact that, despite the lack of evidence of the guilt of the Soviet side, Uruguay still chose to go in the line of the anti-Soviet position of Brazil.

Similar Posts

Huawei 10GE 40KM LC SM SFP-10G-1310 Transer-Buy in the online store online

Online sales of tickets for the match with Dynamo is opened